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Impact of the Media on Fair Trial
Rights: Panel on Media Access
Moderator: James C. Goodale, Esq.a
Panelists: Professor Abraham Abramovskyb
The Hon. Helman R. Brook'
Professor James A. Cohend
George Freeman, Esq.e
David A. Schulz, Esq.!
Carolyn Schurr, Esq.g
MR. GOODALE: We have a panel today on [press] access.
Professor [Abramovsky], shall we begin?
PROFESSOR ABRAMOVSKY: On occasion, we experience
the clash between First Amendment rights and the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial. The reason I use the words "on occasion!'
is that most trials are not even deemed worthy of media attention
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no matter how serious the charge. For example, the killing of one
inner city youth by another will hardly receive local media atten-
tion, let alone national recognition. The cases that draw media
attention emanate from what I believe to be three primary sources:
the prosecution, the defense, and the media itself.
The prosecutor, in announcing an indictment, leaking one, or
even stating that an investigation is in process, can depict a defen-
dant in such a way as to materially prejudice his rights to a fair
trial. This, in turn, has often resulted in defense attorneys trying
to combat fire with fire, which after awhile begins to create some-
what of a circus-like atmosphere.
Usually, however, it is the press, whether it be the printed me-
dia or the electronic media, that seizes on a particular case and
catapults it into a national story. Some examples of these, and I
am restricting them to New York, are of course the Central Park
jogger case, the Amy Fisher case, and the Katie Beers case.
Saturated coverage, especially when inflammatory, almost pre-
cludes a case from being handled in an ordinary fashion. What do
I mean by that? Most cases, as you know, are pled out. However,
this is not so in cases that catch the media's eye-plea bargaining
is out, maximum penalties are in.
Yet, in spite of all the abuses, I still believe that ours remains
the fairest, most democratic of all the processes of the various
nations [whose laws] I have had an occasion to study. (This
speech is not meant in any way to either downgrade or otherwise
deprecate any particular prosecutor or defense attorney.) I do
mean, however, to take to task some of our latest media exhibitions
such as the kindly and sensitive "A Current Affair" program, "Hard
Copy," which often is anything but, and last, but certainly least, the
ubiquitous "Geraldo."
Let's take a look at what has happened to us. Let's take a look
at what I call media overkill. We have the Amy Fisher case.
What was the Amy Fisher case? Basically nothing more than an
attempted murder charge. What did it result in? An overwhelming
amount of media attention which clearly prejudiced the accused.
All the press coverage led to bail being set at an absolutely astro-
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nomical amount unheard of in any other criminal case of its type.
Even after the defendant pled guilty, the media and their quasi-
movie counterparts didn't quit. The viewing public was subjected
to no less than three movies concerning the case-each of the ma-
jor [television] networks had to get in on it. If that wasn't suffi-
cient, Joey Buttafuocco was tried on "Geraldo" in a mock tri-
al-prominent counsel served both in the capacity of prosecutor
and defense counsel.
Now, I ask you, what's going to be next? Will a mock appel-
late court on "Donahue" be called to decide this case? Are we to
await a final decision from a mock Supreme Court of the United
States's opinion which will be given on "Sally Jessy Raphael"?
For the more intellectually oriented in the audience, however, you
have no problems either. We have just tried James Earl Ray on
PBS thirty years after the fact [of the Martin Luther King, Jr., as-
sassination].
Moreover, it is ironic, I believe, that while a jury is repeatedly
admonished in all cases to consider only the evidence and exhibits
which emanate from the witness stand, they are subjected to a
barrage of often inflammatory and irrelevant information prior to
their impanelment. For example, we now have a group, which I
call "trial mavens," who are not even vaguely familiar with the
concepts of law or evidence. What do these folks do? They con-
duct round table discussions-patting each other on the back, com-
plimenting each other-concerning totally erroneous conclusions
which may [be], and often are, viewed by potential jurors.
Additionally, the advent of televised court cases in my opinion
has both positive and negative aspects to it, and I believe that the
negative outweigh the positive. While on the one hand, a lay audi-
ence is able to view what occurs in the courtroom, which is good,
on the other hand, jurors are fed information that will taint their
decision if they are not sequestered. Even in those cases where a
jury is sequestered, I submit to you that the process still may be
tainted.
Let me give you an example of what I mean. Traditionally,
potential witnesses are excluded as a matter of course from the
courtroom to ensure that their testimony does not conveniently
19931
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dovetail-that they do not collaborate prior to taking the stand.
However, what is to prevent a witness from viewing the proceeding
after its first or even second re-run during the evening on Court
TV?
Now, I would like to take a brief look at the overall situation.
Let's really look at what we are seeing. Should the Rodney King
tape have been played at least 150 times prior to the trial? Was it
absolutely necessary to have the videotaped confession of the
youths in the Central Park jogger case played repeatedly on every
conceivable newscast? Should the fact that Katie Beers's assailant,
or alleged assailant, confessed to his attorney be aired repeatedly,
and must the likes of this little girl be subject to an avalanche of
television interviews whenever she is spotted? It's sort of like,
"Which one of us reporters will win the hunt? Let's see which one
of us can go and identify the sheriff or court officer with whom
Katie is residing somewhere out in eastern Long Island."
While there is room'for good television court dramas, I believe
that they should remain fictional. One should always remember,
in my opinion, that the truth-finding process, albeit imperfect,
should be conducted within the contours of the courtroom, rather
than on the courthouse steps, in the yards of neighbors, or with the
friends of the victim or perpetrator.
MR. GOODALE: That certainly put some fat in the fire, as
they say. Now, I think that Dave [Schulz] is going to embroider
some of the general themes-do you want to respond to any of
that, or are you going to wait?
. MR. SCHULZ: Maybe I'll hold off on the response. There are
a few things that I would like to say first, to put the discussion in
context.
MR. GOODALE: And the few things you were going to say
are?
MR. SCHULZ: The issue of where to draw the line between
the press's First Amendment rights and a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights within the criminal justice system, is one that
has been dealt with in many different contexts. It is one that the
Supreme Court has not easily resolved over the years. So maybe
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it's worth going back a little and looking at the history of court-
room access of the decisions in the Supreme Court. It's an inter-
esting history in a lot of different ways.
For example, it's noteworthy, from a constitutional litigation
standpoint, to examine both how the Court developed this access
right and the standard the Court finally adopted. These have far-
reaching implications, not only for access to criminal proceedings,
but also for access rights in other contexts that we might want to
talk about.
Some of you may be familiar with this history. The question
of the press's right of access to criminal proceedings was presented
to the Supreme Court back in 1979 in a case that arose out of New
York state, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale' This case arose in Seneca
County, in upstate New York, where a reporter was barred from a
pre-trial suppression hearing. The case went up to the Supreme
Court as a Sixth Amendment case. - There is a historical reason for
that. Back in the Forties there was precedent that said that the
press did not have an enforceable First Amendment right-the
press had no standing under the First Amendment to claim a right
of access to judicial proceedings.3 Given that limiting precedent,
the Gannett papers tried to argue the case as a Sixth Amendment
case. They claimed that the press has the right to be present at a
[pre-trial] suppression hearing under the "public trial" provision of
the Sixth Amendment, [which guarantees that "the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."4]
In other words, if the proceeding is a "public trial," the public has
an enforceable right to be present.
This case went to the Supreme Court and ended with a 4-1-4
split. The majority essentially concluded that the Sixth Amend-
ment right is one that is personal to a defendant and therefore the
press had no right to stick its nose in and enforce the public trial
1. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
2. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1976), modi-
flied, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
3. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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right. The four dissenters thought to the contrary and actually
crafted a very specific test that they would require a court to per-
form before excluding the press from its proceedings. Justice
Powell was the middle man. He agreed that it was appropriate in
the immediate circumstances to exclude the press, but he added, in
an interesting opinion, that while there is no Sixth Amendment
right, there might be a First Amendment right. However, to the
extent there is a First Amendment right, he found it satisfied by the
procedural safeguards that were followed. Thus, he let the closure
order stand.
There was an immediate uproar over judges closing courtrooms
and great concern about their ability to throw the press out of pro-
ceedings. The very next term, in 1980, another case reached the
Court-the Richmond Newspapers case.' It was grounded in simi-
lar facts, except that it was not a pre-trial proceeding that was
closed but an actual criminal trial. In fact, the case was on its third
trial-there had been various problems with the earlier trials that
had been heard on appeal. At this third trial, the judge finally said
that he was going to be sure there are no mistakes this time-the
press isn't going to be here. He then conducted a secret trial.
Richmond Newspapers was taken up [to the Supreme Court] as
a First Amendment case, and we saw a different result. The Court
found, for the very first time, that under the First Amendment,
there is an enforceable right in the press to go to court to seek the
protection of the First Amendment right to observe in the court-
room. Remember, the press isn't a party to the criminal trial. The
press is only an observer. [However,] the Court said that when the
press is thrown out, and certain procedural standards aren't met,
then the press does have recourse. Reporters can enforce their
right to observe, whether by writ of mandamus or on motion or on
various procedural grounds that were worked out in later cases.
Richmond Newspapers was truly a "watershed case."
6
We spent the next decade trying to define the contours of that
right and just how far it reaches. Is it limited to the trial? Does
5. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
6. id.
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it extend to pre-trial proceedings? By what standard should the
press's right to be in the courtroom be weighed?
There are two things worth noting. One, from a historical
standpoint, by the time we get to a case called Press Enterprise Ii,
7
in 1986, the majority articulates a standard for the First Amend-
ment right of access that essentially adopts the same Sixth Amend-
ment standard articulated by the dissenters in Gannett. This stan-
dard [for closure] remains effective today.
Thus, the Court has come full circle and imposed the obliga-
tions that the dissent argued for in Gannett as a First Amendment
standard. The standard basically requires that four elements be met
before the press can be excluded. The Court articulates the stan-
dard in different ways in different contexts, and it may not always
specifically address each element. But, I would submit that there
are four things that are required [to override the qualified First
Amendment right of access].
The first is a demonstration of a high degree of probability of
injury to some right, that is equally as compelling as the First
Amendment rights of the press. There must be some fundamental
right at stake. In fact, in Press Enterprise II, the Court said there
had to be a showing that there was a "substantial [probability]" that
this other right was going to be prejudiced. In subsequent cases,
the courts have focused [on] what this other right is-either the de-
fendant's fair trial right, which is, of course, a constitutional right,
or privacy rights, or some other right.
But that's the threshold. Before you can deny access to infor-
mation in the hands of the government, there has to be some show-
ing that there is a right that's as important as the First Amendment
right, and that there exists a "substantial [probability]" that right
will be disturbed, absent a restriction of First Amendment rights.
If you meet that threshold, then the second test requires a show-
ing that there is no way to protect that threatened right without
7. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise 11).
8. The interests of those other than the accused, such as victims of sex crimes, may
be implicated. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-10 (1982).
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interfering with the First Amendment rights of the press. In other
words, you first have to look to other solutions[-"reasonable alter-
natives to closure"-]that could avoid denying First Amendment
rights. Obviously, in the context of a Sixth Amendment right to [a
fair] trial, there are a lot of alternatives that don't interfere with the
press's right to access. There is extensive voir dire of jurors to
assure an impartial panel. There is sequestration of jurors. There
is change of venue. There is delay of a trial. With so many possi-
bilities available, the second test also imposes a rather high burden
before a court can conduct proceedings secretly.
If the court decides that there is no alternative that will protect
the Sixth Amendment right, then it still must meet two additional
burdens in fashioning relief. One is that any restraint on the First
Amendment has to be as narrow as possible-that means narrow
in time and narrow in scope.9 If the court is trying to protect, for
example, privacy rights, it can redact documents. In trying to pro-
tect any right to the detriment of the First Amendment right, the
above element must be addressed.
Finally, if the court has satisfied the first three elements, it still
must show that its proposed restriction will be effective. That's
important in various contexts. You may recall that this notion
arises out of the Nebraska Press case,'0 where the trial court im-
posed a gag order on the press to try to protect the fair trial rights.
You may recall that one of the arguments Justice Burger makes is
that in the small community where the trial was to take place, the
residents already knew the information that the judge was ordering
the press not to publish. The theory is that we won't stand by and
allow interference with First Amendment rights for some idle and
unnecessary purpose. If you have met the first three sfeps, you
also must show that the means you propose will be effective in
protecting the other threatened right.
I lay the standard out because we may want to come back to
this in a few minutes. The analysis can be applied to several areas
9. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (Press-
Enterprise I).
10. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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besides the criminal justice system. Indeed, it has been applied in
civil access cases and in some others that we can talk about.
The second interesting aspect of this history is the reasoning
process of the Court, not just the fact that it implicitly reversed
itself and came full circle in the course of five or six years. In the
five cases that were decided between 1979 and 1986, there was an
ongoing dialogue between Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan
about the source of this access right and its proper application.
Chief Justice Burger consistently argued that this right must be
found in historical precedent. To decide if a First Amendment
right of access exists, he believed the Court should look at the
proceeding in question or the type of access at issue and determine
if there was a historical presumption of openness. If there was a
historical access right, the Court should recognize a First Amend-
ment right.
Brennan disagreed with that view and took a more policy ori-
ented approach. He said that the Court should look instead at the
objectives of the First Amendment and determine what goals the
Court is trying to accomplish by recognizing First Amendment
rights. If those goals would be advanced by attaching a First
Amendment right of access to a given situation, the Court should
be prepared to do that.
In his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers," Justice
Brennan articulated at least five or six goals that the First Amend-
ment was designed to advance. His analysis of these factors led
him to conclude that the right of access should be broadly recog-
nized. For example, he argued that allowing the public and the
press into criminal prosecutions protects the accused from secret
inquisitions. He also believed that public knowledge is important
because it ensures that the accuser is getting justice. In other
words, the public has a right to know that proceedings are conduct-
ed fairly and that both the accused and the accuser receive justice
before the courts.
11. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980) (Brennan, I.,
concurring).
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Justice Brennan further noted that the public could have little
confidence in the fairness of criminal procedures if they were not
allowed access through media coverage. He also pointed to the
importance of retribution. The criminal justice system is an obtlet
that allows the public hostility to vent. If you close the proceed-
ings, you deny the public that valuable outlet and you defeat the
ability of the criminal justice system to perform its role.
Finally, Justice Brennan noted that access improves the perfor-
mance of those who are participating in the process. It motivates
the judges and the lawyers and everyone who is involved to be
prepared and to perform as they should. [Press access] also inhib-
its perjury, because if witnesses know that what they say may be
reported in the paper, they are less likely to bend the truth.
That's the context in which these rights have developed. I
think we could have a long discussion about whether the press goes
too far or not far enough.
There is one other issue I want to raise again both because its
history is interesting and because it's a question that has not been
resolved. It concerns the on-going conflict between the First
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment.
This conflict has more to do with gag orders than with access,
but it ties into the issues we have been discussing. I mentioned the
Nebraska Press12 case earlier. The Supreme Court never specifical-
ly decided whether the First Amendment right of access or the
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is to be given priority. It has
avoided deciding the issue, but it came very close in the Nebraska
Press case.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press,
13
was prepared to find, as a matter of constitutional law, that a
claimed threat to the Sixth Amendment right of a fair trial could
never be sufficient to justify a gag order. He said that this was so
because the proof required to demonstrate an actual threat to a fair
trial is too amorphous and difficult to establish. It necessarily
12. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
13. Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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relies heavily on conjecture as to what people in the community
know and how that might affect their judgment.
However, Justice Brennan found that such speculative evidence
was too slender a reed on which a Court could ever allow a gag
order to be imposed. In his opinion, which was joined by three
Justices and supported in a concurrence by Justice White, he ar-
gued that the First Amendment should prevail over the Sixth
Amendment, at least in the context of a gag order.
The reason all this ties together is that the question came up
recently with the Noriega prosecution down in Florida. A gag
order was issued in that case against CNN, which had gained ac-
cess to some tapes of telephone conversations between Noriega and
his lawyers.14 The issue presented and decided by the [Court of
Appeals for the] Eleventh Circuit in Noriega was whether the gag
order had been properly entered.15 The Eleventh Circuit basically
said [that] the court's primary goal is to protect the integrity of the
judicial system, and in a case such as this, the First Amendment
right must necessarily fall to the Sixth Amendment right. They
held, quite clearly, that the Sixth Amendment prevails over the
First Amendment. This, to my reading, is exactly the opposite of
what at least four justices said in the Nebraska Press case.
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court refused to take that
case and denied certiorari. 16 I think that there is still an ongoing
tension between the scope of the First Amendment right and its
relation to the Sixth Amendment right. I think this is a tension that
will not be quickly resolved.
As to whether the press has gone too far, I will note that while
people may think that currently things are out of hand... I suspect
this is something that's been with us [for] a long time and that
people have always felt this way. There is a quote, which none of
the press people up here will enjoy too much, that puts things in
14. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 917 F.2d 1543
(Ilth Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
15. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 976
(1990).
16. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 976 (1990).
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context. It's from Spoon River Anthology which was written back
in 1915."7 I think it was sort of the "Twin Peaks" of its day. It's
a collection of poems of people speaking from the grave about
their lives. Edgar Lee Masters had this to say about the newspaper
publisher in Spoon River, describing what he did as "[t]o scratch
dirt over scandal for money, and exhume it to the winds for re-
venge."
The press has never been held in too high regard. We may just
have to live with that.
MR. GOODALE: I think what I am going to do is start with
George [Freeman] and then come around the table in my direction,
because I had a chance to warm up George while Dave was speak-
ing.
George, isn't Professor Abramovsky absolutely correct and isn't
the Noriega court absolutely correct in concluding that there are
substantial dangers to a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial when the press publishes the sort of material that the pro-
fessor points out? Therefore, isn't Dave [Schulz], or at least the
judges Dave points to, absolutely wrong in thinking that under
practically no circumstances could you ever show that there is such
a danger?
MR. FREEMAN: No, I think the Professor is probably abso-
lutely incorrect. I think that much of what I see as the fallacy of
the argument was included in one sentence that Professor
[Abramovsky] made, which just floated through his speech. It
didn't seem like a controversial issue, but it was kind of a pre-
sumption-and I wrote it down-that all the publicity surrounding
the Amy Fisher case "clearly prejudiced the accused."
It seems to me that the basic fallacy of many of the people who
argue against press access to trials is that somehow the access to
pre-trial hearings and pre-trial publicity all necessarily impacts to
the detriment of the criminal defendant-certainly not a good thing
if it were true.
However, I had the feeling, seeing this dance played out in
17. EDGAR LEE MASTERS, SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY (1915).
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front of our reporters from time to time, that maybe prosecutors
once had an easier time getting the ear of the press than defense
lawyers. But now the situation is reversed, given the basic ebb and
flow and the general standard in this whole dance. I think the fact
is that the prosecutors generally feel somewhat more circumscribed
by their office. But the defense bar is no slouch at getting its angle
across as well. Indeed, in the Amy Fisher case which was men-
tioned, my own take on it, and maybe I am wrong, is that much of
the pre-trial publicity in fact benefitted, and was for the benefit of,
the defendant Amy Fisher. Indeed, many people in the early going
thought that the prosecutors were attacking the wrong person
[when] they really ought to be fingering Joey Buttafuocco. You
know, I must say, it pains me that I even have to mention that
name-this guy has gotten enough publicity and the notion that we
are talking about him is rather irksome-but so be it.
I just don't see, number one, why more publicity about a case
prior to trial means that it's prejudicial to the defendants. Second-
ly, I think publicity before a trial in the incipient stages of a case
is important if for no other reason than [that] most cases never get
to trial. So, if there is going to be public knowledge about the
criminal process, that knowledge has to be imparted during the pre-
trial process because there is no trial process in the vast majority
of cases. Thirdly, even if everything I have said heretofore is
wrong, the fact is that all that pre-trial publicity doesn't really
make the slightest bit of difference when it comes to impaneling a
jury. [This is] because unlike lawyers and reporters, who believe
that the public rises and falls on every one of their words, most
people don't read all this good stuff.
I argued in front of Judge Glasser in the Gotti case that all the
publicity about the Gotti trial and John Gotti-and certainly there
was more of that than most any other case in recent memory, ex-
cept for Joey Buttafuocco-would not make it difficult to impanel
a jury who didn't know what was on the hidden tapes that the
government had been compiling. My argument dealt with the issue
as to whether or not those [tapes] should be sealed. The fact is,
certainly people are aware that John Gotti seems to be connected
to the mob, that he gets a lot of headlines, that he is a "Dapper
19931
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Don," that he wears elegant suits. But I don't believe that is going
to prejudge a juror's mind after sitting through two months of a
trial, or really have a great effect on how they view the case at that
point, having now sifted through all the evidence. I think basically
jurors can discard that, and more importantly, most jurors really
won't have read any of the articles. Whether or not this tape
should be sealed or whether or not this suppression hearing should
be closed is immaterial. Assuming it was open, what they learn or
what they read in those articles will be immaterial to their ability
to be fair jurors-if they read this stuff in the first place.
As I told Judge Glasser, "I am not one of the most unintelligent
people in the Brooklyn [County] venue. Working for a newspaper,
I probably tend to read newspapers more than many other people,
and I haven't read these articles on John Gotti. I don't know why
your assumption is that everyone in this county has." He kind of
smiled and nodded his head, and then he ruled against me.
In any event, I do think that the pre-trial publicity threat to a
fair trial is vastly overrated and I think it underestimates the pub-
lic's ability to be good jurors, number one, and number two, it
vastly overrates the knowledge that the public has about the details
of these trials.
I would also point out in passing that as much as the media
gets attacked, as well it should, as I do, for putting on three movies
about Amy Fisher-and what a totally inane thing to do-the fact
is, these three movies got the highest ratings in God knows how
many years. Why is that so? I can't tell you. But I can say that
it really poses, I think, a dilemma between the public basically
believing that the press is intrusive, that they invade privacy, that
isn't it terrible that we have all these interviews of Amy Fisher's
mother, niece, and boyfriend-yet, at the same time, gobbling this
stuff up. If they didn't gobble it up, it wouldn't be on the air.
That brings me to one other small point having to do with
Katie Beers. I think that's another example of media craziness
gone amuck. On the other hand, the fact of the matter is that the
reason why cameras were taking pictures of Katie Beers going to
school is because the local sheriff tipped the press off as to the
temporary guardian of Katie Beers. He did that because he was in
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some election campaign and wanted the publicity. Now, it's hard
to make the media out to be the fall guy if that's what a public
official is doing. Indeed, I am told that once the press got their
mandatory first shots of her going to school they basically relented
and let her be a regular human being again.
The final point I would make is to disagree violently with the
notion that televised trials are a bad thing in this whole process.
My view is, and I think it was shown clearly in the William Ken-
nedy Smith case, that number one, the more on TV, the better-in
terms of reporting-on what really goes on in a trial. [Televised
trials] point out to the public the contrast between what they per-
ceive to be a judicial proceeding in "L.A. Law" with all the drama
and craziness that goes on there, and the boringness and the
ploddingness of the real judicial system, which I think underscores
its seriousness, and ultimately, its fairness.
Even those who criticize TV coverage of court rooms-because
in the end all you get is a twenty-second snippet on the local news
on at 11:00 p.m.-basically underestimate the fact that on the
twenty-second snippet, even that generally is undramatic. In the
course of a regular trial day, nothing dramatic happens. It's a
slow, boring process. I think that comes through on TV, and so I
think it does give a perception of judicial administration that's
positive to the public. In the William Kennedy Smith case, and
with all the criticism of everything that went on in that case, the
one thing that didn't happen at the end of the day was that people
blamed the verdict on the Kennedys' money. Basically, people had
seen the trial, had seen that it was a fair and serious process, and
I think were therefore willing to accept the result. I think that
would have been quite a different perception had that not been on
TV.
MR. GOODALE: Mr. Brook, here we [have George Freeman]
the representative employed by The New York Times, stating his
views on the subject. Nowhere in any of those views did I hear
any hint of any restraint whatsoever-although, I will give Mr.
Freeman a chance to defend himself later. I mean, he sounded to
me pretty much like an absolutist-not conceding anything. If
your police people were on trial in the Rodney King situation,
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query whether you would be absolutely convinced he was right and
that there would be no prejudice to the jury. But on the other
hand, as a prosecutor, it helps I suppose in a perverse, cynical way
to get that sort of information out, although it certainly doesn't
necessarily redound to your benefit if your trial is moved for a
change of venue or if you are trying a case to a sequestered jury.
So, he has gone too far, hasn't he?
MR. BROOK: Actually, this has been a much more gentle
opening than I anticipated as the prosecutor here. I will get to Mr.
Freeman and your question in a moment, but I want to address
what [Professor Abramovsky] said. He began-as these discus-
sions so often do-by accusing prosecutors of leaking information
in pre-indictment and grand jury stages.
Now, I would not sit here and be so naive as to tell you that no
prosecutors ever leak information to the press, but I want to point
out to all of you that frequently in the investigation stage-when
you read about what a prosecutor is doing-that leak does not
come from the prosecutor's office, but comes [rather] from the
targets of the investigation. I am thinking most commonly in terms
of corruption or political investigations where the targets may be
public officers and politicians. It is much to their advantage to
have these stories break into the press as quickly as possible be-
cause that curtails an investigation rather than furthers it. The last
thing in the world that a prosecutor wants to see is this type of
information in the press.
Be that as it may, I would add a fourth source to Professor
Abramovsky's "media circus" statements--complaining witnesses
who have become media darlings. I think this started with the
Howard Beach case and the Tawana Brawley case where the vic-
tims, and those who were concerned as witnesses, became media
personalities and were the source of a great deal of information.
I think the press, while it has a First Amendment right to pub-
lish these stories, works a Sixth Amendment injustice. Now, to get
to the Sixth Amendment, I want you to understand that the prose-
cutor is caught in a very, very difficult bind here. It's very easy
for reporters and these very learned First Amendment attorneys to
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take an absolutist position in support of the First Amendment. As
an American citizen, and someone who is concerned and in the
public debate, I certainly support wide access to news and informa-
tion [about] government behavior. It is easy for defense counsel
to stand up and say that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
a fair trial has been violated whenever there is pre-trial publicity or
... information about a defendant in the newspaper.
The prosecutor, however, is caught in between these two ex-
tremes and has a difficult balancing act to perform. As a public
official-and certainly as someone who is in the political arena-it
is necessary and correct for a prosecutor to take an open First
Amendment position. But unlike other political figures, a prosecu-
tor has a Sixth Amendment obligation to ensure that justice is done
and to make sure that the trials he completes and the prosecutions
he is engaged in meet constitutional standards. [A prosecutor must
ensure] that defendants' Sixth Amendment'rights are also protected.
That simply is not a defense counsel's obligation.
So, [a prosecutor] always tries to balance the openness that Mr.
Freeman wants with the protections due a defendant, which I am
sure Professor Abramovsky would so ardently defend. That is a
very difficult balancing act, and it is made more so every day by
the types of stories that the professor referred to.
Now, for those of you who thought when they saw that the
Howard Beach special prosecutor was going to be here today that
Joe Hynes would be here, I am sorry to disappoint you, but I was
the last Howard Beach special prosecutor and was caught in exactly
that bind. Defense counsel-who have no obligation other than to
their clients-actively court the press, releasing all kinds of stories
which are favorable to their position during trial and during investi-
gations. I am not saying they don't have a perfect right to do so,
but then a prosecutor is placed in the position of either answering
or not. That is a very, very difficult position.
I took the position that I would not talk to the press at all dur-
ing the [Howard Beach] trial and instructed the other lawyers with
me not to give interviews so that [the only matters that were] re-
ported would be what reporters garnered from courtroom testimony.
Quite frankly, I was pilloried in at least one story in one of New
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York's most prominent newspapers.
I thought this personal attack was [the result of my refusal to
talk] to the reporter and tell him what was going on in bench con-
ferences and off the record.
You have to just suffer along with these kind of attacks because
the press is not only concerned with getting ideas across to the
public, it's also concerned with writing interesting stories that are
going to be read. The two should never be confused.
MR. GOODALB: You are not going to pick on George [Free-
man]?
MR. BROOK: I was pleased by what George said and in fact,
I applauded him if you remember.
MR. GOODALE: Carolyn [Schurr], what's your take on all
this?
MS. SCHURR: Well, I think that Mr. Brook just raised an
incorrect perception that a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are
violated because of publicity. I think that the basic and more im-
portant thing about the Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial are
that they are not inconsistent with the right of access.
One of the most important means of assuring a fair trial is to
open the process to the press and to the public. The Supreme
Court has recognized in all of the access cases-the Press Enter-
prise I & II cases-that by opening up trials to the press and to the
public, the defendant is ensured of fairness and the appearance of
fairness to the public. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court, in
the Press Enterprise I case, said that there is a community thera-
peutic value in keeping trials open so that the public knows that the
criminal justice process works. To say that it's injustice to talk to
witnesses is incorrect; on the contrary, that ensures the fairness of
the process.
I have to make a comment about the Amy Fisher case, because
our paper Newsday was the hometown paper during this case that
has been described as a "media circus." We reported on the case
because it was of interest to the community where Newsday is
located. Obviously, other people picked up on the case for the
same reason. But just to make a vague allegation that the pre-trial
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publicity prejudiced, or would have prejudiced, the trial if Amy
Fisher had gone to trial is not enough. The courts have recognized
[that] that's not enough. Vague allegations are not enough. Empiri-
cal evidence supports that an impartial jury can be impaneled [de-
spite any pre-trial publicity] and that there are reasonable alterna-
tives, such as, if there was a trial, moving it to an alternative venue
or extensive voir dire.
So, I don't think that the Amy Fisher "circus"-a vague allega-
tion that she wouldn't have gotten a fair trial-is enough to have
stopped the media reporting on an important case.
MR. GOODALE: Well, the defendant's not getting much sup-
port from this group, except implicitly from the speaker's point of
view, and the speaker-along with the present speaker-has some
association with Fordham. The additional speaker also has some
association with Fordham. Maybe the Fordham trio-I could in-
clude Dave [Schulz], but I won't-can stand up for the defendant.
Can we, Professor Cohen?
PROFESSOR COHEN: Well, I know that being on the same
side of the case as Professor Abramovsky is going to come home
to haunt me at some point, but let's try it.
First of all, I think that the issue isn't as narrow as has been
described. It is not simply a question of a fair trial, [but] it's a
question of permitting a defendant, and I am going to speak about
society's interest in a second, to be in a situation where he or she
can get whatever it is this justice system has to offer.
In Amy Fisher's case, if the case had not been so titillating,
which is undoubtedly one of the reasons that Newsday did cover it,
she might not have been in the position of receiving a sentence of
five to fifteen years. Had that case come about at a time when the
press was preoccupied with other matters, I can foresee a disposi-
tion of the matter which might be very, very different.
It seems to me that we talk too narrowly if we simply talk
about a fair trial. What happens in the court room is largely gov-
erned by the rules of evidence and by the Constitution and the way
that they have been interpreted by the courts.
So, I don't want to speak so narrowly about the effect of media
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on criminal defendants. I think it is probably broader and more
accurate to talk about the effect on both sides of the case. I am
also not convinced at all that the remedies which are always talked
about as being solutions for publicity, whether [publicity] be exces-
sive, fair or otherwise, are adequate to the task. The fact of the
matter is that in New York State it is extremely difficult to get a
change of venue from one of the larger metropolitan counties such
as in the New York area, or even a change of venue from one of
the more rural counties.
I was involved in a case in Suffolk county, a case that Newsday
covered for eleven years, the Pius murder case.' 8 Although one
defendant was granted a change of venue by the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department-for reasons that still remain a complete
mystery to me-the other defendant was not. And that's a case
which points to a different kind of publicity, I suppose. At least
I hope we won't bd hearing about Amy Fisher for the next eleven
years. In that case, the community did hear about that murder and
the people who were supposedly involved. There is no doubt in
my mind that it had a deep and lasting effect on the members of
that community.
The other issue is that we talk about fairness to the defendant.
We need also to talk about fairness to society. It's one thing to
talk about a risk that adverse or prejudicial publicity may adversely
affect a defendant's right to a fair trial. Televising trials and the
kind of extensi ve publicity that now occurs, at least seemingly with
more and more frequency, may affect the right of the public to get
a fair result in any given case. You might have complainants being
less willing to come forward, less willing to press charges. You
may find a whole lot of those kinds of effects because there is a
perception, true in at least some cases, that they will be subjected
to the kind of media circus that occurred in some of the examples
Professor Abramovsky has talked about.
Let me return just for a minute-you will be sorry that you
have turned me loose on this-to the remedies. You talk about a
18. People v. Brensic, 460 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1983), affd, 506
N.Y.S.2d 570 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1986), rev'd, 509 N.E.2d 1226 (N.Y. 1987).
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change of venue and you talk about doing detailed voir dire. You
talk about instructing jurors not to pay any attention to the media.
Well, the National Law Journal, in one of its recent editions, pub-
lished a survey of people who had served on civil and criminal
juries. It concluded that a large number-more than 50% as I
recall the article--of jurors admitted [to]: 1) reading media reports
or hearing media reports about the case (despite the fact that they
were instructed not to) and 2) routinely not following the court's
instructions to disregard evidence. Those of us who actually try
cases have a strong feeling that in fact jurors routinely don't follow
this kind of instruction. So, it seems to me that the remedies for
excessive and often unfair publicity either for the defendant or for
the public are not very satisfactory and it's just not clear to me that
we have focused on the possible negative effect of excessive pub-
licity in a way that makes much sense.
One thing that we haven't talked about, although Mr. Freeman
alluded to it, is responsible journalism, despite the possibility that
in the end the journalist let Katie Beers go to school. It can't be
good or responsible journalism to chase this poor little girl around.
Consider shows like "Hard Copy" or "A Current Affair" and other
examples like that. Are we talking really about journalism here or
are we talking about business? That's a consideration that courts
ought to begin to focus on more and more. It's one thing to say
the pr6ss ought to have access, there ought not to be gag orders,
[and] there ought not to be prior restraint. When we think of the
First Amendment it's a sort of lofty historical principle. On the
other hand, if we [may] think of it more as a business and think
more about the possibility that Newsday and other media organiza-
tions were motivated and continued to publish stories about Amy
Fisher, not so much because it is newsworthy, but because there is
a perception that titillating articles of that type-and we could sort
of tick off the titillating facts, but we won't-are of interest to the
reader. You know, better they should go and get The [National]
Enquirer from the supermarket newsstand.
MR. GOODALE: Well, Professor [Abramovsky], you have a
chance to clean up all your attackers, but I certainly want to keep
in mind the point just made with respect to responsible journalism.
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It seems to me that [this] was one of your themes, and I would like
to talk about it, if not now, later. It certainly was the theme I was
trying to develop in my colloquy with George Freeman on my
right, and maybe Dave [Schulz] can address it, too.
But anyway, what are your views on what you have heard so
far?
PROFESSOR ABRAMOVSKY: I don't know where to start.
I am getting bombed from all borders here, but let's start with the
various remedial suggestions. Mr. Schulz feels that the way that
you get rid of prejudicial pre-trial publicity is by one, extensive
voir dire, two, sequestration, and three, change of venue.
Now, as Professor Cohen has pointed out, you are most unlike-
ly to get a change of venue in a criminal case. [Furthermore],
sometimes the change of venue that you get will depress you more
than where it is that you [would] have [had] the trial, because as
you know, a judge is not bound by your suggestion as to where it
is that you are going to try the case. I won't give the name of the
city or particular case, but I had a case when we had a change of
venue to a place way upstate. It got to the point that it was Friday
in the afternoon-the planes had left, even the Greyhound had left.
Nothing, however, would keep us in that town. It cost us a $200
cab ride to get back into the city. So, there are all kinds of consid-
erations.
Secondly, a sequestered jury is a completely different jury than
you would get in an ordinary case. A sequestered jury is a jury
that you have to pick, who is willing to sit in a closed environment
for two to three weeks or even months at a time. That's not your
average, ordinary jury.
Third, insofar as the extensive voir dire, the notion here is, and
the cases have so concluded, that the mere fact that the person has
read the article is not enough to disqualify him. It is only if he has
been substantially impressed by it that he will be excused. I don't
believe that once a person has read about the "Dapper Don," as Mr.
Freeman was stating-the head of the Mafia today, the boss of all
bosses-that he hasn't formed any sort of opinion about the defen-
dant.
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With Mr. Freeman I got a little more. The thing here is that I
am not so sure if I understand exactly what he is saying. First he
says-well, I'll tell you-insofar as impaneling the jury, if the
press gets involved, so what? People don't read anyway. Well, if
they don't read anyway, what do we need the press for, and you to
defend them? So, that's number one.
Number two, it seems to me that if the highest rated movies
concerned the Amy Fisher case, the good folks of America must
have read about this case or heard about this case somewhere. I
don't think that they just happened to have clicked [on] the three
different stations on three different weeks at random. Right? In
addition, let's go a little bit further. Was she prejudiced? "No, not
at all," said Mr. Freeman. 'What's the problem calling her 'little
Lolita,' or this is the 'young Fatal Attraction case'-that's not
prejudicial whatsoever!"
The bottom line is, and this is perhaps because we practice
different types of law, that when we pick a jury, Mr. Freeman, we
try to get the most prejudicial jury we can get. My distinguished
colleague to the left, [Mr. Brook], wants a "law and order" prose-
cution. I want folks who like to be in the hills of "The Sound of
Music."
What happens here-and I don't think that I am overstating it,
but maybe I am-[is] that an individual who is living in this day
and age in the New York City metropolitan area and who is a po-
tential juror, would be asked the following questions:
"Did you ever hear of Mr. Gotti?" "No, never did."
"Did you ever read about him?" "No, never did."
"Did you ever discuss it with anybody?" "Never did."
Now, it seems to me that this is not an impartial juror. This is a
yam or a squash, or some other inert thing.
MR. FREEMAN: I am not sure I understand what the lesson
to be drawn from that is, other than that I agree with you that we
ought not to have lambs, or yams. Actually, I agree with your first
point, and I think when we argue that you can sequester the jury
or you can move to Oswego county, as far as I am concerned, we
have lost the argument, because no judge is going to do that, nor
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should he.
So, I agree with you there. But I disagree with the notion that
unless a juror can answer "no" to all those questions-it matters.
The fact is, a juror could have read some of the articles about John
Gotti, and undoubtedly 99% of the panel was aware of who he
was. But two things, it seems to me, spring from that.
One, that doesn't disqualify the person [and] doesn't disqualify
the vast majority of people living in the county from being quali-
fied as jurors and being fair and impartial. Dave Schulz will help
me, but one can go through trial after trial with vast pre-trial pub-
licity where defendants were acquitted. John DeLorean's tapes,
showing him dealing with cocaine, were aired on every TV station,
and he was acquitted. Labor Secretary Donovan was tried in New
York with vast pre-trial publicity that he complained about forever,
and he was acquitted. Gotti was acquitted a number of times. In
every brief we do, we have around five other examples-they fail
me for the time being-but they are [of] people equally notorious,
where publicity was great. So, the notion that because there is
publicity, therefore you can't get a fair trial is disproved empirical-
ly.
Secondly, I am not sure what you would have us do. If the
answer to those questions are "no," "no," and "no," and therefore,
the juror admittedly is a yam, what is the newspaper to do? Not
report about John Gotti at all? Pretend this thing doesn't exist
because we want those answers to be "no," "no," "no"?
It seems to me that the court system does not-cannot--operate
in a vacuum. Unless there is reporting on it, and fairly detailed
and substantive reporting on it, then it, in fact, is going to be sub-
ject to a much greater jeopardy than we are talking about here. [A
court proceeding] that is being carried out in secret without the
public being aware of what's going on is I think, in the end, a
much greater threat to the sanctity and the fairness of the system
than writing about it, as long as that writing is relatively truthful
and accurate.
PROFESSOR ABRAMOVSKY: Well, just to answer you on
the last one--on the Gotti example-it is believed that he had a
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little bit of help in getting acquitted in other cases, basically, be-
cause the jury was bribed.
MR. FREEMAN: At least that wasn't the press's fault.
PROFESSOR ABRAMOVSKY: So, I think that part of the
example sort of needs a little something-I don't want to give you
the impression that I don't want any cases covered. The thing that
I do want to tell you, and I think that you will agree with me, is
that the media chooses certain particular cases. The reason that
they choose these cases is not because of the tremendous meaning
to society, but because of the sordid details-"Here's a guy that
eats up his victims. Wow, let's write all about it. First the neck,
and then the knees, and then in the freezer"--you know what I
mean? This is the thing that I object to. I don't want Star Cham-
ber proceedings any more than anybody else, but, you know, there
are limits.
MR. GOODALE: Dave, do you want to get in on this?
MR. SCHULZ: Well, I was going to make a few brief points.
The first is that I was heartened, I guess, that no one seems to be
disagreeing about the [closure] standard, and no one seems to be
intimating that the press doesn't have a First Amendment right
here. It seems to me that's been settled.
What we are fighting over is when and how that right gets
applied. I think that's what I heard, although I was a little startled
to hear George [Freeman] say that there shouldn't be a change of
venue, because I would argue that of course there should be. In
appropriate cases, if that will help protect a Sixth Amendment
right, not only is it something that should be done, it's something
that the First Amendment requires to be done before you choose
the option of excluding the press from coverage.
The second point is that a lot of what we are arguing about is
different emphases on what the impact of this is, and different
views over what the impact might be. As George [Freeman] men-
tioned, there are lots of cases that could be cited where highly
publicized trials resulted in acquittal. In the ABSCAM case some
years ago-the prosecution of Senator Harrison Williams from
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New Jersey 19 -there was a video-tape in one of the earlier prosecu-
tions of the senator being handed a briefcase full of money. It was
entered into evidence, turned over to the media, and shown on all
the news programs-that Was a highly publicized case. Later, an
argument was made that a subsequent defendint in the case
couldn't get a fair trial. They actually did some testing-this was
in Brooklyn-to try to determine how many people really knew
about the case. They found in that prosecution that only 5% of the
people who were first called in to be on the jury panel knew any-
thing at all about it. This, at the time, was one of the most highly
publicized proceedings in the area. So I think it's easy to overstate
the impact of some of these prosecutions.
To go back to the [closure] standard for a moment-and maybe
this is something people don't want to get into-I do think that
what's significant about the test that the Supreme Court adopted in
[Press-Enterprise 11]20 is that it does have broader application. I
think it's something we could explore. For example, if you look
to the policies that apply, especially those in Brennan's arguments
about when a First Amendment right attached, I think you could
make a very cogent and persuasive argument that there is a consti-
tutional right to bring cameras into the courtroom. I am not saying
it's one that would be accepted, but I think the implication is there.
Another example: the Clinton White House announced in Janu-
ary that they would allow television coverage of their daily news
briefings. After about three weeks they changed their mind and
kicked the cameras out. I think there are arguments that could be
made about the press's right to be there and to have cameras there
that flow from the arguments that have been developed in the crim-
inal context.
MR. GOODALE: Let me tie in the [closure] test that you
talked about and what everyone else is talking about. You have a
four-part test, but the principle part of the test is that there has to
be some showing of probability that there would be a damage to a
19. United States v. Willians, 529 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d
603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
20. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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Sixth Amendment right if you don't get your way-and your way
is to get access. The test is not an absolute test because if you
have an absolute right to [access] then you wouldn't need the test.
So, the test denies you-the press-the absolute right to be there,
all the time. Accordingly, there are some situations where you
shouldn't be there.
Now, we have three press attorneys here and I-as the modera-
tor at the moment--exclude myself from that group. What I
haven't heard from any of you is the situation that you could hy-
pothesize in which a defendant is prejudiced. Is it your point of
view that no defendant is ever prejudiced by pre-trial publicity?
MR. FREEMAN: I can try to answer that, Jim, in a way that
I occasionally do, I suppose in court, and that is, a lot of the dis-
cussion here has really not been about the facts of the way these
things come out in a given case-that all this publicity, "Hard
Copy," all this other stuff, is bad. It's bad for society somehow
because it gives too much publicity to these cases, the standards are
going down, it's going to be prejudicial to someone-we don't
really know who.
All that might be true. I don't disagree necessarily with any of
that, and none of that particularly relates to my newspaper. But the
fact is that's really not a legal argument. It's kind of a complaint
with the Geraldo Riveras, and I think that's fine. But there is not
much any of us can do about that unless we change the First
Amendment entirely.
The question as to pre-trial, publicity in terms of the Sixth
Amendment right and a First Amendment free press right generally
gets played out as a practical matter in a pre-trial suppression hear-
ing. Once you get to trial, it doesn't matter how the trial is cov-
ered, because by then the jurors have been picked and they are
there watching the trial every day. I don't believe that if they go
home and see the re-run on Court TV, that's going to prejudice
them anyhow because they have seen the thing in the first place.
They have seen it live. I can't imagine why they would go and
watch it a second time. Sitting through the whole day is bad
enough. That's not a concern. That's happened once so far in
history. I am not sure that's a valid concern.
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The question is about the specific bits of evidence-not that so-
and-so is a bad guy-because we can test that in the course of two
weeks. The jurors are smart enough to figure out-not that he is
a bad guy or a good guy-but whether, given the specific evidence
that's been introduced, he has violated the law.
The question though is: Is some of that evidence that [the
jurors] are weighing in their heads actual evidence that the judge
has excluded from the court case-from the trial? If so, then that's
the problem. So, the question really comes up in the pre-trial sup-
pression hearing when the judge rules that the "bloody handker-
chief' or the confession, "I did it" should be suppressed because of
police impropriety. In that case, if there is discussion and press
coverage of that hearing, will the New York Post first-page headline
"The Bloody Handkerchief," be remembered so clearly by the jury
that they will not be able to render a fair decision six months later
when they are impaneled and when they go through a trial? If the
answer to that is possibly "yes," if indeed the first-page headline
will be of "The Bloody Handkerchief' that will never be forgotten
or the quote "'I Did It,' Says Defendant," then you can conceivably
have a problem, in answer to Jim's question.
However, it seems to me, that then yields a result which no one
has really mentioned, which is the way some of these cases-the
worst of these cases-should come out, in my opinion. [That] is
that you can still have a pre-trial hearing in open court with the
press and the public in attendance, but what you can do is basically
eliminate the specificity of the confession or of the "[bloody] hand-
kerchief."
In other words, the public should be able to see if the police
mishandled the case, overstepped their constitutional bounds. On
the other hand, you could conduct that hearing without the "bloody
handkerchief' being discussed. The lawyers can agree to call it the
piece of evidence and then the headline can't be "The Bloody
Handkerchief' because the Post doesn't know what the evidence
was. But on the other hand, discussion about it can still be had in
open court. The case can be covered and life will go on.
So, I do think that in the worst case that Jim tries to postu-
late-and I don't think there are many of them, because don't for-
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get these pre-trial hearings happen half-a-year before the actual trial
and the jury has well forgotten about it [and] because so many
other Joey Buttafuocco's have arisen in the meantime to blur it all
in the juror's mind-there is a potential solution that kind of comes
between both-is a compromise for both sides.
MR. GOODALE: So you [favor a] substantially absolute test?
MR. FREEMAN: I was much more reasonable this morning
[on the panel on fair trial rights]. I am not sure why.
MR. GOODALE: Except for the "bloody handkerchief," the
press could do what it wants. Do you have any views on this sub-
ject?
MR. BROOK: Well, yes. I agree with Mr. Freeman that the
greatest danger of prejudice and violation of the Sixth Amendment
[arises] with the pre-trial publication of evidence that is not admis-
sible but is submitted to the public for its consideration.
We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that there can be substantial
prejudice of a jury even while a trial is going on, and that I think
is the "media circus" that Professor [Abramovsky] was talking
about-and the one which prosecutors face. [The risk is substan-
tial] because you never know whether a jury is deciding the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence based upon the evidence given to them
in court and the jury charge, or [whether they are deciding based
on] the comments that attorneys make to the press that are reported
on television, or the interviews the attorneys give on the courthouse
steps. [These comments] may be significantly different from the
testimony that was actually heard in court and certainly will have
a slant and an inference which is favorable to one particular side.
That's why prosecutors are caught in such a bind when they
have to keep silent and not discuss the evidence while a trial is
going on. [Prosecutors must go out of their way] to protect a de-
fendant who is then exercising his rights. I don't deny for a mo-
ment that defendants have a right to do that, but [prosecutors must
be concerned by defendants'] attempts to garner favor and possibly
to assuage jurors with extra-courtroom discussions of evidence.
It's a very, very difficult problem.
MR. GOODALE: I want to put something to the press and
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perhaps we will get you back in on this question. But, before I do
that, do you have any further responses?
MS. SCHURR: Well, I think the legislatures have recognized
the potential for prejudice in all camera-in-the-courtroom statutes,
the Southern District of New York guidelines, and the New York
State Judiciary Law. The legislatures have given judges the discre-
tion to remove the cameras even in the middle of a trial if there is
this possibility of prejudice. But they do recognize up front that
there should be this right of access unless the prejudice exists.
PROFESSOR COHEN: It's very hard for me to understand
how the "bloody handkerchief' isn't going to be revealed. I under-
stand how you can set up procedures, but I don't understand how
that's really going to be kept a secret.
MR. FREEMAN: If it's not kept a secret, it's presumably
because the prosecution will have leaked [it].
PROFESSOR COHEN: No, either the prosecution or the de-
fense.
MR. FREEMAN: The question is, if it is.
PROFESSOR COHEN: Or the reporter, through good investi-
gative work, has discovered that what we are really talking about
here is a "bloody handkerchief' or what we are really talking about
is "I did it."
MR. FREEMAN: Let me go back a step, and Jim [Goodale]
will be happy because this involves the case that he was involved
in, which is the "Pentagon Papers" case. The fact is that the sys-
tem works when the press is trying to get information. That's its
job-to get information from the prosecution, to make them talk
maybe beyond the rules of ethics, [and to get information from] the
defendant's lawyers-good journalistic work, as Professor Cohen
said. That's his job.
The judicial system's job is the opposite. It is to keep stuff
within itself until it comes out in a public trial. The press
shouldn't be held responsible if a prosecutor wants to leak informa-
tion to it. The press's job is to publish the information that gets
leaked.
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So, the notion that we should blame the press or somehow
restrict the press because the lawyers, in jockeying for position, are
giving the press information is, I think, ill-founded logic. The fact
is, then, we ought to have stricter ethical rules or remedies and
punish lawyers who talk when they are not suppose to talk. It's
very easy, but I don't -think that's a press problem. That's not a
First Amendment problem. That's a judicial administration prob-
lem.
That's really why the "bloody handkerchief' will come
out-because soraeone is going to leak it to us or else we are good
enough that we will find [out]. Well, that's our job. There is a lot
of discussion about the press, but it really is a problem of the judi-
cial system not working the way it should.
MR. GOODALE: That's exactly the question I wanted to get
to, which is, does the press have any responsibility? Your answer
in part was-I don't want to put words in your mouth-but it
seemed to me "no." The press's job is to get it out.
MR. FREEMAN: The press ought not decide for itself, "Well,
I can report this, because this isn't really prejudicial, but I won't
report that, which I know, because it may be a little more prejudi-
cial." That would be a hell of a role for us to be in.
MR. GOODALE: But George, we are sitting here after two
weeks of probably the worst time the press has had with it's
role-with respect to responsibility-that I can remember. We
have the NBC situation, where the press faked-totally faked-an
example of negligence on the part of General Motors, although
NBC, by the way, did a very good job standing up and saying that
it did it, I thought. We have had a situation where USA Today
yesterday said that it faked a photograph, and NBC had another
situation where it had to say its photograph wasn't correct.
So, what bothers me from what I hear around the table-at
least on the press side-is [that] I don't see what role the press has
with respect to responsibility. Secondly, I don't see or hear what
role lawyers for the press have with respect to that concept. That's
what bothers me. Also there is-I don't'want to take too much
time on this-but there is a part of the Nebraska Press case that
19931
322 FORDHAM ENT., MEDIA & INTELL. PROP. L.F.
talks about this. Dave [Schulz], if you want to say something be-
fore I get into that, go ahead.
MR. SCHULZ: I think the examples that you have given are
examples that show that the press is accountable-that if NBC
fakes something it could be liable. It could be liable for substantial
money damages.
No one would argue that the press can misrepresent, that the
press can distort, [that] the press can fake, or [that] the press can
deceive the public. But, I don't think that it is appropriate to put
a burden on the press, as George [Freeman] was suggesting, to sort
through what's important versus what's not, at least in the context
of a criminal trial. The press shouldn't have to decide what impact
their reporting will have on the trial, or be held accountable for the
outcome of the trial process. That role is for the participants in the
process.
I want to respond to a point that was made earlier about how
you do this-how you keep the "bloody handkerchief' out. It's
something that's done all the time. In the Mario Biaggi prosecu-
tion, the whole dispute in the pre-trial suppression hearing had to
do with certain wiretap information. Judge Weinstein held exten-
sive oral argument without any of the information on the wiretap
being disclosed because he gave the lawyers certain guidelines as
to what they could say and what they couldn't. I think that's an
example of what George [Freeman] was talking about-that there
are ways to accommodate the legitimate interests of the public in
knowing that the system works, and the legitimate interests of the
accused in having a fair trial.
PROFESSOR COHEN: Yes, I am not suggesting that there
will never be a case in which you could redact, if you will, the
reference to the evidence that's being discussed. I am only sug-
gesting that it is not something that will always work and that
someone will either leak it or that the press on its own will dis-
cover the information. Wiretap information is relatively easy be-
cause it's secret-unless someone from law enforcement wants to
leak it or unless, once the defense gets a hold of it, they want to
leak it. The "bloody handkerchief' is going to be much more
widely known in a police department, or the fact that the defendant
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confessed will be much more widely know.
Jim really raises an interesting question. Why doesn't the press
have any responsibility? The press makes decisions every day
about what to publish, what to reveal and why. When you do that,
it seems to me you consider all sorts of factors. Is the reader going
to be interested in this? Is it newsworthy? Will we be sued?
Would we win the suit? Is it worth paying for the suit? A whole
variety of other considerations. Why is it inappropriate to sug-
gest-or why is it at least inappropriate to put it on the table-that
one of those considerations ought to be: If we talk about the
"bloody handkerchief' will we be eliminating the possibility that
this defendant will have a fair trial?
MR. FREEMAN: I think there are a lot of answers to that.
One is that the decision on what should be published depends real-
ly on one factor-is it newsworthy? Not on other factors-cer-
tainly not on whether or not we'll be sued. I suppose my role
takes place before that decision is made. Therefore, the answer is
we won't be sued or we don't care if we'll be sued because if we
are sued we will win. So that's not really a factor.
I think, certainly, if there are any other factors than "what is
newsworthy," they are factors which are within the control, or at
least within the body of knowledge, of the editorial staff. Whether
something is prejudicial to the legal system or to a defendant is not
such a thing, and I think it would put an enormous and improper
burden on the newspaper or on TV to have to make that deci-
sion-that's not a decision for [the press] to make. I also think it
would be aggregating more power than it has now, and it's certain-
ly criticized for the power it has now, if somehow the system plac-
es that burden on its hands, because then it's going to be deciding
in its discretion whether to help this defendant or that defendant or
not help this defendant or that defendant in every given case.
That's hardly a decision on a case-by-case basis that newspaper
editors should make.
Thirdly, to get back to the basics, I think the whole problem is
overstated, because 99 times out of 100 a fair jury can still be
picked that is somewhat more intelligent than yams [and] that
hasn't read in great detail the specifics that are in the article. If the
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problem is that the jurors know that Gotti is kind of tied up with
the mob, I don't think there is any defense to that. There is no
way we can keep jurors from knowing that unless you want us to
shut down entirely.
So, I guess I don't see that in the end it's that great a problem.
Indeed, the record supports that-trials have been given huge pub-
licity and defendants have gotten off.
PROFESSOR COHEN: Except you are suggesting that there-
fore the publicity didn't impact negatively. I guess the point I
wanted to make earlier is that maybe it did, and the negative [ef-
fect] is that the defendant got off. Maybe society wasn't benefited
by the publicity.
MR. FREEMAN: It's hard to argue that where you see a tape
of someone either accepting money or delivering cocaine and then
that person gets off, one can argue that those tapes somehow ended
up aiding the defendant. They have to aid the prosecution-the
defendant got off notwithstanding that.
MR. GOODALE: Well, let me be particular about the question
of responsibility of the press in this narrow area of fair trial/free
press. In the Nebraska Press case, to which you alluded in your
discussion, four of the Justices effectively concluded that the test
probably was an absolute test, but the Court was not willing to
adopt it at that time with respect to what the press publishes about
a pre-trial proceeding. Justice Brennan said that even though this
is so, the press ought to continue its efforts with bar associations
and other interested parties with respect to articulating fair trial/free
press guidelines.
What I was trying to push this discussion toward is why-in
the view of that distinguished jurist (and also because it is a fact
that all the papers represented on this panel are members of the
New York State Fair Trial/Free Press Conference)-aren't the
guidelines followed? After all, the guidelines only do what I have
suggested the press should do in the free press/fair trial con-
text-i.e. be responsible.
Any other comments? Questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: As one who tries cases, I thought it
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might be helpful to the audience to know something about which
very little, if anything, has been said here, and that is the aftermath
of a trial and how the view of the jury system exists in the mind
of the American public now.
Those of us who try cases, as everyone who tries cases knows,
often discuss with jurors at the end of the case what led them to
the verdict that they arrived at-this is a matter of helping our own
craftsmanship, knowing what makes certain people tick and what
we did wrong, [and] what we did right and helps us pick the next
jury. We now have a phenomenon where journalists are question-
ing jurors, and in some cases, the questioning is very aggressive.
They go to jurors' homes. They phone them. Does anyone on the
panel have any strong feelings about the appropriateness of this,
and also whether it's a salutary thing in terms of how the jury
system is supposed to operate in this country?
MR. FREEMAN: Well, yes. I think it's a salutary thing. I
think that we are helping you. We are assisting. I think the fact
is that it imparts more education to all lawyers.
There was an incredible article written in the American Law-
yer-in fact the first such article they described about the ju-
ry-regarding a Washington Post libel case which concluded
that-I shouldn't say that in this audience-the jury in that case
was led by a law student who had misguided other jurors. I am
not sure what that taught us, but it certainly was an interesting
discussion of what goes on behind the jury room doors.
I don't see any problem with that. I do see a problem, frankly,
in the Rodney King case with newspapers publishing the addresses
of jurors. I think that was dumb and I doubt any newspaper will
do that in the future.
But as to the post-jury discussion, I think: a) it is interesting
and newsworthy, and b) it informs the public and maybe makes
them feel a little better about the jury system, because invariably
the jurors have much more sophisticated explanations of their deci-
sion than what the first day's story would indicate, [and] that de-
spite such and such evidence the jury concluded "X." Everyone is
reading, gee, that's a weird jury. It was racial or it was this or it
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was that. The second day, when you interview the jurors generally,
confidence is built that they decided [the verdict] on the merits and
fairly. So, I think it's a good thing.
MR. BROOK: I would totally disagree with what Mr. Freeman
said. While again, I will concede that the press has an absolute
right to question these jurors and interview them and print their
views, the question was whether it has a salutary effect. It certain-
ly does not and it's very harmful to the criminal justice system. I
certainly would draw a line as to whether it's beneficial to society
as a whole. One, it skews jury voir dire because in these high-pro-
file cases you are liable to get performers-rather than fair-minded
jurors-people who are looking forward to these post-trial inter-
views. In fact, if you remember, in one case we had a problem
where the jury foreman, through her boyfriend, was negotiating to
sell the story of the jury's deliberations-an issue which had to be
argued extensively on appeal.
I think that the difference here is not with whether or not the
press has a right to do anything. I think we have all conceded
throughout the panel that the press has extensive rights.. But just
because you have a right to do something doesn't mean it's right
to do it. [Furthermore,] just because you can constitutionally pub-
lish a story doesn't mean it's wise to do so. I think what we really
need to discuss is the degeneration of the media into programs like
"Hard Copy"--an example of the press vociferously arguing and
always doing what it has a right to do without exercising the re-
straint which courtesy and wisdom should really mandate.
MR. FREEMAN: Let me just answer that for one second,
because I too decry "Hard Copy" and I think that the media should
be wise and courteous. But with the specific question, which I
think is a good question and which we seem to take significant
issue on, is a serious [journalist may] interview jurors after a trial.
The theme that I get from a lot of the practicing lawyers who
were involved in these cases is that [such an interviewing process]
is a bad thing because it reveals too much about what really went
on at trial. [This] will either make it more difficult [for the law-
yer] next time or show some of the weakness in his performance
or in the way he picks a jury, and [this will make] make his life as
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a practicing criminal lawyer tougher. That may be true and that
may be a bad thing.
On the other hand, while it makes the administration of justice
in a given case more difficult (though I don't understand that be-
cause this article comes out after the case is over), it gives legiti-
macy because of the reasoning of the jury being explained in a
rational way, which almost always is the outcome.
But, in most cases, the jury explains its decision quite rationally
in these interviews. It seems to me that anything that gives the
public confidence that the system worked is far more important
than any of this internal stuff about making voir dire harder and all
this other stuff which has to do with the implementation on a case-
by-case basis of a trial.
It seems to me that if the press is used as a means of building
public confidence in the judicial system, we have done a good job
and that's what I see happening in those articles.
PROFESSOR ABRAMOVSKY: Let me just ask you one
thing. I think Mr. Goodale was trying to pin you on something
and you sort of got away. Let's see if we could pin you on this
one.
Let's assume that it was up to you as to whether jury delibera-
tions-never mind interviews afterwards--could be televised [live].
Let's say it was possible-with a camera you could do it. Would
you do this?
MR. FREEMAN: I don't see why not. It may not prejudice
the verdict because the folks are in the jury room discussing their
verdict as they speak. So, the fact that it's televised publicly, I am
not sure it matters-though maybe it would affect the deliberations
and thus be a problem.
PROFESSOR ABRAMOVSKY: You think the fact that ten or
fourteen or sixteen million people are watching this jury delibera-
tion will have no effect whatsoever on this?
MR. FREEMAN: I would think that the result is going to be
made public in any event. I don't know. I never really thought of
that.
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MR. GOODALE: Well, guess what, folks. Time is up. I
guess the issue that was posed here, as we got through it and down
to the end, was what limitation, if any, can be put on press free-
dom. You have heard a variety of comments on that issue.
